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Meaningful Involvement in Collections:
Should Ethics or the FDCPA Govern?
Jeffrey S. Peters*
I.

Introduction

Under federal law, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”) protects consumer-debtors from abusive debt collection
practices.1 Many FDCPA lawsuits stem from debtors’ confusion with
the wording of a debt collection letter sent on law firm letterhead.2
While the FDCPA makes no mention of the amount of involvement
necessary for an attorney to refrain from misleading a debtor, the
judicially created doctrine of “meaningful involvement”3 has developed
to essentially provide debtors with a cause of action against attorneys.
Nevertheless, violations of this doctrine border on violations of the
American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“MRPC”).4 The MRPC provides the professional standards by
which lawyers are to abide “for purposes of professional discipline.”5
Each state, with the exception of California, has adopted ethical rules in
the format of the MRPC to govern attorney conduct.6 But, “[t]he Rules
of Professional Conduct are [not] intended . . . to create civil liability.” 7
* J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2014); B.S., The Pennsylvania
State University (2010). I would like to thank my family and friends for their support
throughout law school. I would like to give special thanks to my brother, Michael J.
Peters, Esq., for sparking my interest in this topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my
colleagues on PACE LAW REVIEW for their work in the editing process of this Note.
1. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
2. A debt collection letter is known as a “dunning letter.” For a discussion of case
law see infra Part IV.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope ¶ 14 (2013).
6. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A. CTR.
FOR
PROF’L
RESP.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Aug.
30, 2014).
7. Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL 664812,
at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (quoting Cohen v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P, No. 08-
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However, in light of a New Jersey joint-committee ethics opinion
(“Ethics Opinion”),8 which determined that sending a debt collection
letter on law firm letterhead is “the practice of law” and a violation of
New Jersey’s Rules of Professional Conduct absent attorney
involvement,9 violations of state ethical codes are, in essence, the basis
for civil liability against attorney conduct under the FDCPA. Which
brings us to the question: Should ethics or the FDCPA govern
“meaningful involvement” in collections? In order to explore the answer
to this question, a discussion of FDCPA case law and the Ethics
Opinion’s impact on attorneys is necessary because violating state ethical
codes are “a matter of concern to the states”10 and purportedly outside
the scope of the FDCPA.11
This Note will explain and analyze the FDCPA and its case law. It
will also discuss the interplay between the FDCPA case law and its
ethical overtones. To understand the basis of this issue, Part II of this
Note will begin by briefly developing the history and background of the
FDCPA12 and discuss specific sections of the law designed to protect
debtors from abusive debt collection practices.13 Notably, these sections
relate to the prevention of improper practices for misleading debtors,14
and are the focus of the lawsuits that this Note will discuss.
Accordingly, Part III will briefly discuss what a dunning letter is and the
similarities of the two standards of review used by the federal courts of
appeals to determine whether a dunning letter is misleading.15 Part IV of
this Note will discuss the judicially created doctrine of “meaningful
1084 (SRC), 2008 WL 4513569, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2008) (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 714
A.2d 271, 277 (N.J. 1998))); see also Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
P.A., 750 P.2d 118, 123 (N.M. 1988); Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds,
P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tenn. 1991) (quoting Terry Cove North, Inc. v. Marr &
Friedlander, P.C., 521 So. 2d 22, 23 (Ala. 1988) (“The Code of Professional
Responsibility is designed not to create a private cause of action for infractions of
disciplinary rules, but to establish a remedy solely disciplinary in nature.”)).
8. Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinion 48; Advisory Comm. on
Prof’l Ethics Opinion 725, 208 N.J. L.J. 58, 58 (2012) [hereinafter Ethics Opinion].
9. See Don Maurice, NJ Ethics Opinion Deems Sending Collection Letters as the
Practice of Law, THE CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES BLOG (June 4, 2012),
http://consumerfsblog.com/2012/06/nj-ethics-opinion-deems-sending-collection-lettersas-the-practice-of-law/.
10. Cohen, 2008 WL 4513569, at *7.
11. Id. at 7-8 (discussing the purpose of the FDCPA).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692g (2012); see also infra Parts II.C.1-2.
14. §§ 1692e, 1692g.
15. See infra Part III.
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involvement” and how the federal courts have allowed attorneys to
include an appropriate disclosure of the level of involvement.16 Part V of
this Note will discuss the Ethics Opinion in detail and its resulting impact
on disclaiming attorney involvement.17 Specifically, this Note will
address the direct conflict between the Ethics Opinion and federal case
law, which allows attorneys to disclaim their involvement when sending
an initial communication under the FDCPA.18 Finally, Part VI will
propose a solution to resolve the conflict between the varying case law
and the ethical issues presented.19
The courts must correct the lack of uniformity in applying the
FDCPA in order for consumer-debtors and debt collection attorneys to
better understand how the FDCPA applies. Additionally, because the
statutory language of the FDCPA does not include the words
“meaningful involvement,” it is important for the federal courts to have
guidance in applying this doctrine uniformly.
A congressional
amendment to include the words is rather unlikely, and would not solve
the issue. Even if the words were added to the statutory language, this
would seemingly impose ethical-like violations—a matter for the states
to handle—into federal legislation. The FDCPA should not be the place
for ethical issues, as each state has the power to discipline their own
attorneys by enforcing violations of the unauthorized practice of law, just
as New Jersey has proposed in its Ethics Opinion. Furthermore, this
would eliminate the use of a disclaimer in dunning letters and increase
uniformity across the country.
However, if these ethically focused “meaningful involvement”
lawsuits under the FDCPA continue to go forward, the presumption in
each case should be that the attorney has maintained the requisite
standard of ethical behavior. This presumption should be a high one,
having the plaintiff prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
attorney violated ethical responsibilities, and thus violated the FDCPA.
This may limit plaintiff lawsuits to those the FDCPA was implemented
to protect: where law firm letterhead was lent to a debt collection agency
without any attorney involvement. To begin exploring this issue, it is
important to review the FDCPA.

16.
17.
18.
2005).
19.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See, e.g., Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir.
See infra Part VI.
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The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

History and Background

After finding that there was “abundant evidence of the use of
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt
collectors,”20 Congress enacted the FDCPA in 197721 to protect debtors
in the consumer-debt context.22
The FDCPA protects any
“communication” that a debtor receives from a debt collector.23 The
term “debt collector” has been construed broadly and is said to be
separated into two parts24: 1) “any person who uses any instrumentality
of interstate commerce or the mails in any business”25 and 2) “any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.”26 Under the original
language of the FDCPA, attorneys were exempt from the definition of a
debt collector.27 Not only were attorneys participating in some of the
same abusive debt collection practices,28 they were “boasting that they
had an advantage over other debt collectors because they did not have to
comply with the FDCPA.”29 The provision which originally exempted

20. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) (2012).
21. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, §§ 802-818, 91 Stat.
874 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (“the subject of the transaction [is] primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes”).
23. Id. § 1692a(2) (stating that a “communication” is “the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium”).
24. See Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
3107, 3115 & n.52 (2010) (citing § 1692(a)(6); Scott J. Burnham, What Attorneys Should
Know About the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, the 2 Do’s and the 200 Don’ts of
Debt Collection, 59 MONT. L. REV. 179, 185-86 (1998)).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
26. Id.
27. See Eric M. Berman, Why Changes Must be Made to the Standards of Review
Used to Determine Meaningful Attorney Involvement Under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 2 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)
(1977) (excluding any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in
the name of a client)).
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-405, at 4-5 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752,
1754-56.
29. Burnham, supra note 24, at 185.
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attorneys was amended in 1986.30 However, one question remained:
whether the 1986 amendment addressed attorneys who were regularly
trying to collect debts through litigation without being in the debt
collection business.31 The 1995 Supreme Court decision in Heintz v.
Jenkins,32 resolved this issue when a unanimous Court held that the 1986
amendment extended to protect attorneys who “regularly” perform debt
collection practices.33 In light of this decision and the Seventh Circuit’s
subsequent decision in Jenkins v. Heintz,34 the issue of the ethical
responsibility of an attorney in the debt collection practice remained
open and leads to a discussion of the purpose of the FDCPA.
B.

The Purpose of the FDCPA

Congress determined there are “means other than misrepresentation
or other abusive debt collection practices”35 available to debt collectors.
Thus, the established purpose of the FDCPA is “to eliminate abusive
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”36 However, the
“FDCPA is not intended to enable consumers to avoid paying their
legitimate debts.”37 It is intended to allow debtors to repay those debts
without being subject to misrepresentations, fraud, and other abusive
practices by debt collectors.38 Consequently, an examination of several
30. See An Act to Amend the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 99361, § 803(6), 100 Stat. 768 (1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6)
(2012)).
31. See Burnham, supra note 24, at 185.
32. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
33. Id. at 299.
34. 124 F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendants’ attorneys were
protected from liability because there was no obligation to investigate the validity of the
debt prior to filing a lawsuit).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c).
36. Id. § 1692(e) (emphasis added).
37. Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt
Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 720 (2006) (citing Lynn A.S. Araki,
Comment, Rx for Abusive Debt Collection Practices: Amend the FDCPA, 17 U. HAW. L.
REV. 69, 77 (1995)).
38. See id. (citing David A. Schulman, The Effectiveness of Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 2 BANK. DEV. J. 171, 172 (1985) (quoting 123 CONG.
REC. 10,241 (1977) (“[E]very individual, whether or not he owes a debt, has the right to
be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.”))).
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statutory provisions of the FDCPA is appropriate to show how the
objectives of the law are met.
C.

Key Statutory Provisions
1. Section 1692e – False or Misleading Representations

Section 1692e of the FDCPA provides sixteen examples of conduct
which are each considered a violation of the FDCPA based on false or
misleading representations by debt collectors in communications with
debtors.39 For purposes of this Note, the two main subsections of §
1692e that will be discussed are subsection (3) and subsection (10).
Section 1692e(3) prohibits “the false representation or implication that
any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an
attorney.”40
Section 1692e(10) prohibits “the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any
debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.”41 Violations of
these provisions generally occur when several interpretations of the debt
collection letter sent to a debtor can be discerned, causing him or her to
be misled.42 Another violation of § 1692e occurs when the judicially
created doctrine of “meaningful involvement” is violated.43 Notably
absent from § 1692e are the words “meaningful involvement.”44 A more
in-depth discussion of this doctrine will be featured in Part IV.45
2. Section 1692g – Validation of Debts
Section 1692g provides the requirements that the initial
communication, usually a debt collection letter, must contain in order to
comply with the FDCPA.46 Section 1692g is another frequently litigated
section of the FDCPA.47 Under § 1692g(a), “within five days after the
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
40. Id. § 1692e(3).
41. Id. § 1692e(10).
42. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3115.
43. See infra Part IV for case law examples of “meaningful involvement”
violations.
44. 15 U.S.C § 1692e.
45. See infra Part IV.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
47. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3116 & n.65 (citing Jerry D. Brown, Painting a
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initial communication” a debtor must receive a written notice from the
debt collector that contains the following:
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor
to whom the debt is owed; (3) a statement that unless the
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice,
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt
collector; (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the
debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that
the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of
a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such
verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer
by the debt collector; and (5) a statement that, upon the
consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period,
the debt collector will provide the consumer with the
name and address of the original creditor, if different
from the current creditor.48
Section 1692g(b) includes a required moratorium on debt collection
practices if the debtor disputes the debt claimed in the communication
until the debt is verified.49 Verification of the debt merely requires that
the debtor confirm in writing that the amount demanded is what the
creditor claims it is.50 There is no requirement that the debtor forward
copies of bills or evidence of the debt to the debt collector at that time.51
Nonetheless, failure to respond to dispute the debt is not an admission by
the debtor that the debt is valid.52 There is clearly a nexus in the statute
between § 1692e and § 1692g because of the necessity of notice
demonstrated in § 1692g and the requirement that the notice cannot be
Mustache on the Mona Lisa—How Tinkering with the Validation Notice Will Get You
Every Time, 53 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 42 (1999) (estimating that ninety percent of
all FDCPA claims come under § 1692g); see also Laurie A. Lucas & Alvin C. Harrell,
2000 Update in the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 55 BUS. LAW. 1453,
1454 (2002) (noting that § 1692g is one of the most litigated sections of the FDCPA).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5).
49. Id. § 1692g(b).
50. Berman, supra note 27, at 23 (citing Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406
(4th Cir. 1998)).
51. Id.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c).
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false or misleading in § 1692e.
III. Dunning Letters and the Standard of Review for Violations § 1692e
A.

What is a Dunning Letter?

The initial letter that a debt collector sends to a debtor is known as a
dunning letter.53 As stated in Part II, several of the requirements for
dunning letters are found in § 1692g.54 Besides satisfying the validation
requirements of § 1692g, each dunning letter must include the §
1692e(11) requirement informing the debtor that, “the debt collector is
attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be
used for that purpose.”55 This requirement is known as the dunning
letter’s “Miranda Warning.”56 The warning is meant to inform the debtor
of the context of the dunning letter and who it is from. 57 Along with
those requirements, violations of § 1692e have been reviewed under the
standards that the least sophisticated consumer or the unsophisticated
consumer is not deceived by the contents of the dunning letter. Although
these standards differ in name,58 as discussed below, they are relatively
the same.59
B.

The Standards of Review
1. The Least Sophisticated Consumer

Of the two standards of review for determining whether a dunning
letter violates § 1692e, the “least sophisticated consumer” standard is the
“most widely accepted test.”60 Including the Second Circuit, the least
53. See LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1189 n.7 (11th Cir.
2010) (“Since ‘dunning’ means ‘to make persistent demands upon [another] for
payment,’ a ‘dunning letter’ may be considered as simply another name for a letter of
collection.” (quoting Dun Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/dun (last visited Aug. 30, 2014))).
54. See supra Part II.C.2.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).
56. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3116 (citing John P. Holahan, Emerging Issues in
Debt Collection Law, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 267, 268 (2008)).
57. Id.
58. See infra Parts III.B.1-2.
59. See infra Part III.B.3.
60. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/7

8

1248

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

sophisticated consumer also has been adopted by the Third,61 Fourth,62
Sixth,63 Ninth,64 and Eleventh65 Circuits. The least sophisticated
consumer standard is an objective test that “protects all consumers, the
gullible as well as the shrewd.”66 This standard was adopted because of
“the assumption that consumers of below-average sophistication or
intelligence are especially vulnerable to fraudulent schemes.”67 The
court in Clomon v. Jackson68 discussed three reasons that the least
sophisticated consumer standard protects consumers.69 “First, courts
have held that collection notices violate the FDCPA if the notices contain
language that ‘overshadows’ or ‘contradicts’ other language that informs
consumers of their rights.”70 Second, “courts have found collection
notices misleading where they employ formats or typefaces which tend
to obscure important information that appears in the notice.”71 Third and
finally, “courts have held that collection notices can be deceptive if they
are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of which
is inaccurate.”72 Although this standard adopts a very low burden
regarding the debtor’s ability to understand a dunning letter, the “concept
of reasonableness” is still preserved.73 While the Clomon court noted
that there is a variety of interpretations of the least sophisticated
consumer standard,74 the standard “effectively serves its dual purpose: it
(1) ensures the protection of all consumers, even the naïve and the
trusting, against deceptive debt collection practices, and (2) protects debt
collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of

61. Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991).
62. United States v. Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1996).
63. Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992).
64. Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (11th Cir. 1985).
66. Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).
67. Id. at 1319.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991)).
71. Id. (citing Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982)).
72. Id. (citing Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (D. Del. 1992)).
73. Id. (citing Rosa v. Gaynor, 784 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D. Conn. 1989) (explaining that
the FDCPA “reach[es] a reasonable interpretation of a [collection] notice by even the
least sophisticated.”)).
74. Id. One example of the variety of interpretations is that, “even the ‘least
sophisticated consumer’ can be presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of
information about the real world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some
care.” Id.
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collection notices.”75
2. The Unsophisticated Consumer
The standard of review that has been adopted by the Seventh76 and
Eighth77 Circuits for determining whether a dunning letter violates §
1692e, is the “unsophisticated consumer.”78 While the court in Gammon
v. GC Services79 agreed with the analysis provided by the Second Circuit
in Clomon80 in adopting the least sophisticated consumer standard,81 the
Gammon court noted that a different standard would “relieve the
incongruity between what the standard would entail if read literally, and
the way courts have interpreted the standard.”82 The Gammon court
determined it was “virtually impossible to analyze a debt collection letter
based on the reasonable interpretations of the least sophisticated
consumer.”83 Moreover, the Gammon court stated that, “the least
sophisticated consumer is not merely ‘below average,’ he is the very last
rung on the sophistication ladder.”84 In continuing its dismantling of the
standard, the Gammon court further stated that, “[e]ven assuming that he
would be willing to do so, such a consumer would likely not be able to
read a collection notice with care (or at all), let alone interpret it in a
reasonable fashion.”85 Thus, the Gammon court decided that the correct
term was “unsophisticated” because “the hypothetical consumer . . . who
is uninformed, naïve, or trusting” has an “objective element of
reasonableness” to him.86 This reasonableness requirement protects debt
collectors from “unrealistic or peculiar interpretations of collection
letters.”87

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 1319-20.
Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir. 1994).
Duffy v. Landberg, 215 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir. 2000).
See Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1257.
Id.
Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1318-20.
See Gammon, 27 F.2d at 1257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. What is the Difference and Does it Matter?
Is there really a difference between the least sophisticated consumer
and the unsophisticated consumer? In his dissenting opinion in Gonzalez
v. Kay,88 a case where the majority used the least sophisticated consumer
standard to determine whether a dunning letter violated § 1692e,89
Circuit Judge E. Grady Jolly noted that the term unsophisticated does not
mean “illiterate or ignorant or indifferent or careless.”90 Furthermore,
Circuit Judge Jolly states that “a serious policy consideration is
implicated here: the uniform application of a federal statute.”91 In a
similar case, Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC,92 Circuit
Judge Kent A. Jordan also dissented based on reasoning similar to
Circuit Judge Jolly.93 Again, as in Gonzalez, the majority opinion
applied the least sophisticated consumer standard to a dunning letter that
purportedly violated § 1692e.94 In his dissent, Circuit Judge Jordan uses
the least sophisticated consumer and unsophisticated consumer monikers
interchangeably.95 On one of his main points, Circuit Judge Jordan
stated that, “[t]o say that the least sophisticated consumer would not flip
the page to read the entire letter, particularly when prompted to do so by
a conspicuous notice on the front of the letter” is to allow the purpose of
the FDCPA to be frustrated.96 Finally, in his concurrence in Gammon,
Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, part of a court that has rejected the
least sophisticated consumer standard, opined that the unsophisticated
consumer is “hypothetical in the same sense as the reasonable person of
tort law is hypothetical.”97 However, Circuit Judge Easterbrook
concluded by stating that, “what proportion is high enough, and how the
extent of misunderstanding will be established, is something the district
court will have to mull over,” when describing the remanded issue of
how the unsophisticated consumer will have construed the dunning
88. 577 F.3d 600, 607-12 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting). For a further
discussion of Circuit Judge Jolly’s dissent, see Part IV.B.2.
89. Id. at 605-07 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 609 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 611.
92. 650 F.3d 993 (3rd Cir. 2011).
93. Id. at 1005-07 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 1003 (majority opinion).
95. See id. at 1006 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1006-07.
97. Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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letter.98
Although these cases have fought with the concepts of the least
sophisticated consumer and the unsophisticated consumer in determining
violations of § 1692e, it seems to be more an issue of semantics than of
an actual difference in the law.99 The characteristics of both the least
sophisticated consumer and the unsophisticated consumer are relatively
the same. Due to the need for uniformity, the federal courts should adopt
one standard that combines the concepts of both the least sophisticated
consumer and the unsophisticated consumer. This will make attorneys
and consumer-debtors aware of the standard that a dunning letter will be
evaluated by.
IV. Attorney Involvement in the Debt Collection Practice
A. “Meaningful Involvement”
Keeping in mind the standards of review,100 attorneys must be aware
of whether they have misrepresented their status as an attorney in the
debt collection process. This issue “has repeatedly reared its head in
lawsuits.”101 Attorneys can participate in the debt collection process
directly “by writing letters, pursuing collection, or filing suit to collect
delinquent debts.”102 However, attorney-debt collectors cannot simply
lend their letterhead to be attached to a dunning letter without taking a
meaningful role, as it is a violation of § 1692e(3).103 Moreover, because
the debt collection process of sending dunning letters is “routinely
mechanized and delegated,”104 attorneys need to have some level of
98. Id. at 1260.
99. Notably, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit does not
choose a standard and evaluates cases under both standards. See McMurray v.
ProCollect, Inc., 687 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2012) (“We ‘must evaluate any potential
deception in the [dunning] letter under an unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer
standard.’” (quoting Goswami v. Am. Collections Enter., Inc., 377 F.3d 488, 495 (5th
Cir. 2004))).
100. See supra Part III.B.1-2.
101. CCH Incorporated, Circuit Court Ruling Could Impact Collection Letters: Is
Attorney "Meaningfully Involved"?, 25 NO 4. HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR 3, 3 (2011).
102. Holahan, supra note 56, at 270.
103. See Berman, supra note 27, at 5 (citing Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 644
(7th Cir. 2001)).
104. Andrea M. Bergia, Note, No Shelter from the Storm: Dangers from the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act to Mortgage Industry Attorneys and a Call for Legislative
Action, 29 REV. LITIG. 391, 412 (2010).
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participation in the process to comport with the requirements of the
FDCPA.
What level of attorney involvement is necessary though? Are these
lawsuits within the purpose of the FDCPA? Turning to the statute
provides no clear answer, as it is devoid of the amount of involvement
necessary.105 Nonetheless, case law interpreting the FDCPA has created
the doctrine of “meaningful involvement.”106 This may be because
“[c]ourts recognize that sometimes collection agencies make reference to
an attorney in its collection demands so as to put additional pressure on
debtors to pay by threatening further attorney involvement if payments is
not made.”107 In other words, “the price of poker has just gone up.”108
One scholar suggests that “meaningful involvement” is related to the
attorney-client relationship.109
However, a precise definition of
“meaningful involvement” has proved somewhat elusive for the
courts.110 Therefore, examining the case law which has created the
doctrine is in order.
1. Beginnings of “Meaningful Involvement”
In Clomon v. Jackson,111 the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment
of the district court which had granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff-debtor, Christ Clomon, in an action for damages under the
FDCPA.112 Clomon had allegedly owed a debt of $9.42.113 After the
district court granted summary judgment for Clomon, it also granted
Clomon’s motion for the maximum statutory damages of $1,000.114
Nevertheless, the district court found no actual damages,115 and therefore,
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012).
106. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 228 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Clomon v.
Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1320 (2d Cir. 1993).
107. CCH Incorporated, supra note 101, at 3.
108. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3121 (citing Avila, 84 F.3d at 229).
109. See Berman, supra note 27, at 4 (stating that “[i]f an attorney-client
relationship exists in which the attorney is actively participating and providing services to
his client, and the client benefits from the provision of such services, there is meaningful
involvement.”).
110. See id. at 3 (noting that the challenge of whether an attorney is “meaningfully
involved . . . is quite vexing in application.”).
111. 988 F.2d at 1314.
112. See id. at 1316.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1317.
115. Id.
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the facts of Clomon should be discussed further.
As part-time general counsel for the collection agency, a letterhead
with defendant Jackson’s name and position on it, as well as a copy of
his signature was printed on five of the six dunning letters sent to
Clomon.116 However, Jackson had no “direct personal involvement” in
the collection process.117 Applying the least sophisticated consumer
standard,118 the Second Circuit held that the use of Jackson’s letterhead
and signature gave “the impression that the letters were communications
from an attorney.”119 Moreover, Jackson “played virtually no day-to-day
role in the debt collection process,” and the dunning letters were “not
‘from’ Jackson in any meaningful sense of that word.”120 The Clomon
court reasoned that:
[T]he use of an attorney’s signature on a collection letter
implies that the letter is “from” the attorney who signed
it; it implies, in other words, that the attorney directly
controlled or supervised the process through which the
letter was sent. . . . [T]he use of an attorney’s signature
implies—at least in the absence of language to the
contrary—that the attorney signing the letter formed an
opinion about how to manage the case of the debtor to
whom the letter was sent. In a mass mailing, these
implications are frequently false: the attorney whose
signature is used might play no role either in sending the
letters or in determining who should receive them. For
this reason, there will be few, if any, cases in which a
mass-produced collection letter bearing the facsimile of
an attorney’s signature will comply with the restrictions
imposed by § 1692e.121
Thus, because Jackson had no real involvement, he violated § 1692e.122
Additionally, in Avila v. Rubin,123 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 1316-17.
Id. at 1317.
See supra Part III.B.1.
See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 1321 (emphasis added).
Id.
84 F.3d 222 (7th Cir. 1996).
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judgment of the district court which had granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff-debtor, Raul Avila, in a class action claiming violations,
inter alia, of § 1692e(3).124 The Avila court stated that “Clomon
establishe[d] that an attorney sending dunning letters must be directly
and personally involved in the mailing of the letters in order to comply
with the strictures of FDCPA.”125 Under facts similar to Clomon, the
Avila court, applying the unsophisticated consumer standard,126 held that
Rubin, the defendant-attorney, violated § 1692e(3).127 The Avila court
reasoned that:
A letter from an attorney implies that a real lawyer,
acting like a lawyer usually acts, directly controlled or
supervised the process which the letter was sent. That’s
the essence of the connotation that accompanies the title
of ‘attorney.’ A debt collection letter on an attorney’s
letterhead conveys authority. . . . The attorney letter
implies that the attorney has reached a considered,
professional judgment that the debtor is delinquent and
is a candidate for legal action. And the letter also
implies that the attorney has some personal involvement
in the decision to send the letter. Thus, if a debt
collection (attorney or otherwise) wants to take
advantage of the special connotation of the word
‘attorney’ in the minds of delinquent consumer debtors
to better effect collection of the debt, the debt collector
should at least ensure that an attorney has become
professionally involved in the debtor’s file. Any other
result would sanction the wholesale licensing of an
attorney’s name for commercial purposes, in derogation
of professional standards . . . .128
Therefore, because the “true source of the ‘attorney’ letters was the
124. See id. at 225.
125. Id. at 228.
126. See supra Part III.B.2.
127. See Avila, 84 F.3d at 229. The court also noted that Rubin merely reviewed
and approved the form of dunning letters and a non-attorney ‘legal assistant collector’”
made the decision on when to send a dunning letter. Id. at 225.
128. Id. (emphasis added). The court also quoted the American Bar Association,
Formal Op. 68 (1932), for the proposition that public policy requires that attorneys must,
at the very least, approve correspondence purporting to come from them. Id.
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collection agent who pressed a button on the agency’s computer,” Rubin
violated the FDCPA.129 These two cases have provided the basis for the
“meaningful involvement” doctrine, but courts have not attempted to
further define the doctrine other than providing examples of what is not
considered “meaningful involvement.”130
2. The Aftermath of Clomon and Avila
Following the analysis of Clomon and Avila, several courts have
declined to set a minimum standard for “meaningful involvement.”131
This may be because “the inquiry is too fact specific” to apply a set
standard for all cases.132 Nevertheless, some explanation of what is
sufficient to satisfy the standard would provide useful insight to
determine violations of the FDCPA. Perhaps the opportunity has yet to
present itself or perhaps the courts do not want to provide attorneys with
a roadmap to commit fraudulent acts.
The court in Boyd v. Wexler133 reversed summary judgment for the
defendant-attorney on the grounds that the affidavit, which stated Wexler
or attorneys from his firm reviewed client files before issuing a dunning
letter, had serious doubt casted on it by evidence of the volume of letters
sent out by his firm.134 In declining to set a standard, the Boyd court
noted that “the ultimate professional judgment concerning the existence
of a valid debt is reserved to the lawyer.”135
Moreover, the court in Nielsen v. Dickerson136 determined that “in
all material respects [their] case was on all fours with Avila.”137
However, the court noted some “minor” distinguishing facts between the
attorney in their case and the attorneys from Avila, Clomon, and other
129. Id. at 230.
130. See Berman, supra note 27, at 8.
131. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 304 (2d Cir. 2003)
(declining to adopt a minimum standard “to satisfy Clomon’s requirement of meaningful
attorney involvement.”); Nielsen v. Dickerson, 307 F.3d 623, 638 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the attorney’s involvement “still fell markedly short of what [Avila and Clomon]
require”); Boyd v. Wexler, 275 F.3d 642, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that the issue of
“the minimum amount of lawyer review required” to satisfy Avila has not been resolved).
132. See Stueben, supra note 24, at 3122 (citing Boyd, 275 F.3d at 647; Berman,
supra note 27, at 1).
133. 275 F.3d at 642.
134. See id. at 644-46.
135. Id. at 647-48; see also Stueben, supra note 24, at 3122.
136. 307 F.3d at 623.
137. See id. at 639.
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cases:
[He] reviewed the master contract governing [the]
accounts; he looked at the minimal information that [the
collection agency] provided regarding each overdue
account, and therefore knew the identities of debtors
who were to receive the letters; he checked the debtor
information for typographical errors and to weed out
debtors who had already received a letter from him, had
declared bankruptcy, or lived in a prohibited state; and
he handled letters and phone calls received by his firm to
the extent of categorizing them and forwarding them to
[the collection agency].138
The Nielsen court found that these “minor” differences “amounted to no
more than a ‘veneer’ of compliance with the FDCPA.”139 Yet, the court
failed to establish what an attorney needs to do to have “some
professional involvement” to comport with § 1692e.140
Furthermore, the court in Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.141
reversed summary judgment for the defendant law firms because the
plaintiff’s discovery requests were “directly related to the ‘meaningful
involvement’ claim at issue.”142 The Miller court further reasoned that
the defendant law firm “merely being told by a client that a debt is
overdue” does not satisfy the requirements of Clomon.143 Here, the court
declined to set a minimum standard based on the record available
because “there may be circumstances where, following discovery, it
becomes clear that the attorney’s familiarity with the client’s contracts
and practices would negate the need to review some if not all of the
documents plaintiff seeks to require.”144
Nonetheless, the court in Miller v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz145
138. Id. at 638 (internal citations omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 321 F.3d 292 (2d Cir. 2003).
142. See id. at 303. The court found that the affidavits provided by attorneys for the
defendants stating that they reviewed files and confirmed that there were debts
outstanding were insufficient as a matter of law to detail the amount of attorney
involvement and, thus, more discovery was needed. Id. at 299, 307.
143. Id. at 304 (citation omitted).
144. Id.
145. 687 F. Supp. 2d 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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seemed to find an attorney’s conduct offensive—stating that
“Slamowitz’s testimony . . . lack[ed] [] credibility based on his lack of
facility in answering basic questions about his practice and the Miller
file, his demeanor on the witness stand, and his interest in the outcome of
these proceedings.”146 The court further stated that Slamowitz’s
“familiarity with his own firm’s files, both paper and electronic, was
woefully inadequate for a man who professed to be an experienced and
able collections attorney, confident in the systems and processes in place
that guided his work.”147
While most of these cases involve attorneys who did little more than
review the basic information provided to them by their clients prior to
printing and sending a dunning letter to the debtor, several cases suggest
that the filing of a lawsuit without having evidence of a debt is not a
violation of the FDCPA.148
In Harvey v. Great Seneca Financial Corporation,149 the court
concluded that “the filing of a debt collection-lawsuit without the
immediate means of proving the debt” does not violate the FDCPA. 150
The court noted that this was not a “deceptive practice” in violation of §
1692e.151 Moreover, the court in Slanina v. United Recovery Systems,
LP,152 granted a motion to dismiss, even though a collection agency sent
a dunning letter to Slania demanding payment of a debt.153 The court
granted the motion “because there is no obligation under the FDCPA for
a debt collector to verify a debt prior to collection.”154 Likewise in
Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP,155 the court found, that although
the firm “appears to have acted upon the information provided by its
client,” there was no violation of the FDCPA in pursuing a lawsuit
without the requisite evidence of a debt.156

146. See id. at 99.
147. Id.
148. See Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2006);
Slanina v. United Recovery Sys., LP, No. 3:11-CV-1391, 2011 WL 5008367, at *2-3
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011); Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10-1323, 2011 WL
2971540, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011).
149. 453 F.3d at 324.
150. See id. at 330.
151. Id. at 331.
152. 2011 WL 5008367, at *1.
153. See id.
154. Id. at *2.
155. 2011 WL 2971540, at *1.
156. See id. at *6.
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These cases, while not directly involving “meaningful involvement”
claims, show that an attorney can pursue legal action against a debtor
without having complete evidence of a debt—seemingly less
involvement than issuing a dunning letter without reviewing information
beyond basic pedigree information of a debtor. They do, however, pose
some of the same ethical questions. Moreover, in the case of filing a
lawsuit without evidence of the debt, the threat of legal action is no
longer a threat, it has come to fruition. The MRPC provides that, “a
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”157 If a dunning letter is sent prior to litigation,
with the intent to proceed to litigation, then it should follow that Rule 1.3
would require attorneys to perform their due diligence prior to filing
legal action. Thus, the issue should not even proceed under the FDCPA
and should be an issue solely for attorney discipline by the states.
However, another issue was added to the “meaningful involvement”
doctrine and further muddied the waters when a law firm was permitted
to appropriately disclose their level of involvement in collecting a debt.
B.

Disclaimer of “Meaningful Involvement”
1. Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas L.L.P.158

The case of Greco v. Trauner, Cohen & Thomas, L.L.P. created a
change in the “meaningful involvement” doctrine by allowing a
disclaimer of attorney involvement to be included in a dunning letter
without violating the FDCPA.159 In Greco, plaintiff-debtor Andrew
Greco received a dunning letter from the defendants Trauner, Cohen &
Thomas, L.L.P on their firm letterhead.160 The letter stated that the law
firm represented Bank of America and also contained the § 1692g
requirements.161 The letter also included the following sentence: “At this
time, no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular
circumstances of your account.”162 The letter was not signed by an
individual attorney, but had the law firm’s name in the signature block.163
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013).
412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005).
See id. at 365.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362.
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Andrew Greco then filed a lawsuit against the law firm and the attorneys
in their individual capacity claiming violations of § 1692e and §
1692g.164 His suit specifically claimed that the defendants violated §
1692e(3) and § 1692e(10) by misrepresenting the amount of “attorney
involvement” in the dunning letter.165
Applying the least sophisticated consumer standard,166 the district
court determined, as a matter of law, that there were no violations of the
FDCPA because the dunning letter “was not misleading in its
representation of attorney involvement.”167 The district court concluded
the letter “prominently stated in normal typeface that ‘[a]t this time, no
attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the particular
circumstances of your account.’”168 Moreover, it reasoned that “the least
sophisticated of debtors would understand that . . . no attorney had yet
recommended filing a lawsuit.”169
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Greco argued that by placing the
dunning letter on law firm letterhead and having the law firm’s name in
the signature block, a violation of § 1692e occurred.170 Greco asserted
that “an attorney cannot send a collection letter without being
meaningfully involved as an attorney within the collection process.”171
Greco argued that the dunning letter here was similar to those in Clomon
v. Jackson172 and Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.,173 and therefore,
the defendants violated § 1692e.174
In its analysis, the Second Circuit articulated that “Greco’s claim
rests on a misunderstanding of the FDCPA’s requirements, and of [the
court’s] prior explications of that statute.”175 The Second Circuit further
reasoned that it does not follow from the FDCPA that attorneys may
participate in the process of debt collection only by providing legal
services—they may provide other services so long as their status as an
164. Id. The court’s discussion of the § 1692g claim is not relevant to the issue of
“meaningful involvement.”
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. See supra Part III.B.1.
167. See Greco, 412 F.3d at 362.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 363.
171. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See 988 F.2d 1314, 1321 (2d Cir. 1993).
173. See 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003).
174. See Greco, 412 F.3d at 364.
175. Id.
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attorney does not mislead a debtor.176 The court continued by stating that
“prior precedents” allowed “disclaimers that should make clear even to
the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ that the law firm or attorney sending
the letter is not, at the time of the letter’s transmission, acting as an
attorney.”177 Finally, the court noted that a dunning letter on law firm
letterhead represents involvement by an attorney, but it is an implied
level of involvement.178 Distinguishing the dunning letter in Greco from
those in Clomon and Miller, the Second Circuit found that the disclaimer
in Greco’s letter was “clear” and “explain[ed] the limited extent of
[attorney] involvement in the collection of Greco’s debt.”179 Thus, even
the least sophisticated debtor would be able to understand that this letter
intended no attorney involvement.180
2. Other Disclaimer Cases
Several other courts have been faced with whether a disclaimer is
sufficient to comport with the FDCPA.181 In Gonzalez v. Kay,182 the
Fifth Circuit, citing to Greco, stated that a disclaimer shows “that the
lawyer is wearing a ‘debt collector’ hat and not a ‘lawyer’ hat when

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 365.
180. Id.
181. Compare Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 1003
(3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting a disclaimer when placed on the back), Gonzalez v. Kay, 577
F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (same), Robertson v. Richard J. Boudreau & Assocs., LLC,
No. C09-1681 BZ, 2009 WL 5108479, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009) (rejecting Greco
as unpersuasive), and Dunn v. Derrick E. McGavic, P.C., 653 F. Supp. 2d. 1109, 1114
(D. Or. 2009) (finding the dunning letter more convoluted than the dunning letter in
Greco), with Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL
664812, at *6-9 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012) (discussing Greco and Lesher and finding that the
disclaimer on the front of the dunning letter did not violate the FDCPA), Martsolf v. JBC
Legal Group, P.C., No. 1:04-CV-1346, 2008 WL 275719, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008)
(holding defendant liable because “[t]he letters do not include a disclaimer stating that no
attorney has personally reviewed the debt.”), Navarro v. Eskanos & Adler, No. C 0602231 WHA, 2007 WL 549904, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007 (denying the defendant’s
summary judgment because “[t]he letter contains no disclaimer of an attorney’s
involvement.”), and Pujol v. Universal Fid. Corp., No. 03 CV 5524 (JG), 2004 WL
1278163, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s case because the
disclaimer, “I have not, nor will I, review each detail of your account status, unless you
so request” would not make the least sophisticated consumer believe that an attorney had
reviewed the file).
182. 577 F.3d at 600.
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sending out [a dunning] letter.”183 Although the disclaimer in Gonzalez
was exactly the same as the one in Greco, 184 the Fifth Circuit found its
placement on the back of the dunning letter violated the FDCPA.185 The
court reasoned through a sliding-scale approach that some letters “are not
deceptive based on the language and placement of the disclaimer,” some
letters “violate the FDCPA as a matter of law,” and others are “[i]n the
middle . . . [and] include contradictory messages.”186 The court
continued by determining that disclaimers are not per se unenforceable,
stating that, “[t]he disclaimer must explain to even the least sophisticated
consumer that lawyers may also be debt collectors and that the lawyer is
operating only as a debt collector at that time.”187 However, the
dissenting judge noted that the dunning letter “conforms in every respect
to the standards for legality recognized by the Second Circuit in Greco”
and the majority “effectively creat[ed] a circuit split” by distinguishing
placement of the disclaimer.188 Moreover, in Lesher v. Law Offices of
Mitchell N. Kay, PC189 the Third Circuit, dealing with the same
disclaimer as in Greco190 and almost the exact same dunning letter as in
Gonzalez,191 held that a disclaimer on the back violated the FDCPA.192
The dissent by Circuit Judge Jordan in Lesher193 agreed with the dissent
by Circuit Judge Jolly in Gonzalez.194 Circuit Judge Jordan, stated that
Circuit Judge Jolly was “exactly correct” and further said, “[w]ithout
legal mumbo jumbo, [the] disclaimer tells any reasonable reader,
including the least sophisticated, that, ‘while this was a letter from a law
firm, no attorney had specifically examined the recipient’s account
information.”195 Finally, in Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C.,196 the
183. See id. at 604 (citing Greco, 412 F.3d at 361-62).
184. Id. at 602, 606; Greco, 412 F.3d at 361.
185. See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607.
186. See id. at 606; see also Laurie A. Lucas & Mike Voorhees, Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act: The Regulatory Environment and Recent Appellate Cases, 65
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 13 (2011).
187. See Gonzalez, 577 F.3d at 607.
188. See id. at 607. (Jolly, J., dissenting).
189. 650 F.3d 993 (3d Cir. 2011).
190. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir.
2005).
191. See 577 F.3d at 602 (majority opinion).
192. See Lesher, 650 F.3d at 1001.
193. See id. at 1004-07 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
194. See 577 F.3d at 607-12 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 1006.
196. See Eddis v. Midland Funding, L.L.C., No. 11-3923 (JBS/AMD), 2012 WL
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District of New Jersey, comparing the same disclaimer as in Greco197 and
Lesher,198 determined that the disclaimer did not violate the FDCPA
because the content of the disclaimer was sufficient and it was in the
main text of the dunning letter.199
Faced with another argument by the plaintiff, the district court in
Eddis further rejected the notion that the New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct provided a private cause of action and thus a
violation § 1692e of the FDCPA.200 The Eddis court noted that several
other district courts had determined that “unauthorized practice of law
claims are not cognizable under the FDCPA.”201 Moreover, the court
reasoned that the New Jersey Supreme Court had stated that there could
be no independent causes of action based on a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct.202
Allowing an attorney to waive involvement in a case to comport
with the FDCPA may seem troubling to consumer-debtors. After all, an
attorney, whether involved in the debt collection process or some other
field, must be cognizant of their responsibilities to the legal profession as
a whole. The due diligence requirements of MRPC 1.3 are only one
requirement that attorneys must follow. States may provide their own
interpretation of ethical rules through ethics opinions. Thus, in light of
the Ethics Opinion, the disclaimer in Greco that was found to comport
with the FDCPA in Eddis, was struck down.
V.
A.

The Ethics Opinion

Discussion of the Ethics Opinion

Directed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law (“UPLC”) and the Advisory Committee
on Professional Ethics (“ACPE”), reviewed several prior ethics opinions
664812, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2012).
197. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir.
2005).
198. See 650 F.3d at 1001 (majority opinion).
199. See Eddis, 2012 WL 664812, at *8-9.
200. See id. at *9.
201. See id. (quoting Cohen v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., No. 08 1084 (SRC),
2008 WL 4513569, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 2, 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(collecting cases)).
202. See Eddis, 2012 WL 664812, at *10 (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 277
(N.J. 1998)).
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issued by their respective bodies203 and reaffirmed their rulings.204 The
Ethics Opinion also “reaffirm[ed] that, before sending a [dunning] letter,
lawyers must exercise professional judgment by independently
evaluating collection demands and determining that proceedings to
enforce collection are warranted.”205 The New Jersey Supreme Court
asked for review by the joint ethics committees after imposing discipline
on an attorney for renting his name and letterhead to a collection
agency.206 Furthermore, the attorney exercised no judgment in collecting
debts.207 The collection agency engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and the attorney violated two separate New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct.208
The Ethics Opinion further stated that an ABA ethics opinion
addressed the same issue and ruled that a lawyer must have independent
judgment over dunning letters.209 Agreeing with the ABA opinion, the
Ethics Opinion stated that, “[e]xercising independent professional
judgment is a fundamental and indispensable element of the practice of
law. A lawyer who fails to exercise independent professional judgment
has abdicated the practice of law, has demonstrated a lack of
competence, and has committed gross negligence, in violation of [NJ]
RPC 1.1(a).”210
The Ethics Opinion, noting that the FDCPA and the New Jersey
Rules of Professional Conduct “are distinct bodies of law,”211 discussed

203. See UPLC Op. 8, 95 N.J. L.J. 105 (1972) (determining that a collection agency
sending a dunning letter to a debtor threatening legal action or implying that the dunning
letter was sent at the request of an attorney is the unauthorized practice of law); see also
ACPE Op. 259, 96 N.J. L.J. 754 (1973) (finding a violation of ethical duties if an attorney
lends their letterhead to clients to place on dunning letters); see generally ACPE Op. 506,
110 N.J. L.J. 408 (1982) (discussing the same and stating that “Opinion 259 remains the
guide in this area”).
204. Ethics Opinion, supra note 8.
205. See id.
206. See id. This conduct is also not allowed by the FDCPA. See supra note 103
and accompanying text.
207. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8.
208. See id. The attorney “violated [NJ] RPC 5.5(a)(2) (assisting a nonlawyer in
the unauthorized practice of law) and [NJ] RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).” Id.
209. ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1368 (1976)
(discussing “Mass Mailing of Form Collection Letters”).
210. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8, at 59 n.1 (“RPC 1.1(a) (Competence)
provides that ‘[a] lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle or neglect a matter entrusted to the lawyer
in such manner that the lawyer’s conduct constitutes gross negligence.’”).
211. See id. at 59.
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several FDCPA cases which “differentiate between lawyers acting in a
‘lawyer capacity’—which would require the exercise of professional
judgment and meaningful involvement in the collection matter—and
lawyers not acting in a ‘lawyer capacity,’ acting as a lay debt
collection.”212 Moreover, the Ethics Opinion states that even if the
FDCPA allows a law firm to send dunning letters in a lay capacity, the
New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct have forbidden it.213 Finally,
the Ethics Opinion ruled:
A lawyer cannot disclaim the fact that he or she is
engaging in the practice of law when using law firm
letterhead. A lawyer who has not reviewed the file,
made appropriate inquiry, and exercised professional
judgment has engaged in an incompetent and grossly
negligent practice of law in violation of RPC 1.1(a). A
lawyer who permits office staff, or a client, to send
[dunning] letters when the lawyer has not individually
reviewed the file, made appropriate inquiry, and
exercised professional judgment, is assisting in
unauthorized practice of law in violation of [NJ] RPC
5.5(a)(2) and engaging in deceitful conduct in violation
of [NJ] RPC 8.4(c).214
B.

The Resulting Effects

In the aftermath of the Ethics Opinion, New Jersey attorneys are no
longer allowed to use the disclaimer made prevalent by the Second
Circuit in Greco.215 As one attorney has noted, it “should be seen as the
equivalent of a ‘Please Kick Me’ sign placed on one’s back as it may
lead to an inquiry by the Office of Attorney Ethics.”216 Because the
attorneys are “engaged in the practice of law,” they are not allowed to

212. See id. (discussing Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d
993, 1003 (3d Cir. 2011), Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009), Miller v.
Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 301 (2d Cir. 2003), and Avila v. Rubin 84
F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996)).
213. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8.
214. See id.
215. See Maurice, supra note 9 (citing In re Goldstein, 560 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.J.
1989)).
216. See id.
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use a disclaimer stating that they are not acting as an attorney.217 While
the Ethics Opinion noted that the FDCPA and the New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct “are distinct bodies of law,”218 it seems that this
ruling effectively strengthens the “meaningful involvement” doctrine and
requires more than that doctrine deems adequate. Moreover, it forbids
New Jersey attorneys from a certain practice under a federal statute that
attorneys in other states can use. Thus, it destroys any uniformity the
federal courts have in applying federal law across the states.
VI. The Remedy
In order to increase uniformity and resolve “effectively creat[ed] []
circuit split[s]”219 in the application of the FDCPA, several remedies are
available. As suggested earlier, the federal courts should adopt a
consistent standard of review for violations of the FDCPA.220 In doing
so, attorneys and consumer-debtors will be aware of the standard that
dunning letters must meet to comply with the FDCPA and it will have a
uniform name, like the “the reasonable person of tort law.”221
A congressional amendment to the FDCPA to include “meaningful
involvement” is both unlikely and insufficient to solve the issue. It is
unlikely to provide the correct solution because the issues presented by
the doctrine are properly handled by the states through attorney
discipline, although the Avila court believed that a lack of “meaningful
involvement” could result in “derogation of professional standards.”222
MRPC 1.3 requires attorney to meet diligence requirements.223 Also,
MRPC 5.5(a) prevents lawyers from assisting others in the unauthorized
practice of law.224 If these rules are more strictly enforced by the states,
the FDCPA can prevent the abusive debt collection practices it is meant
to prevent rather than lawsuits for statutory damages only. Furthermore,
once litigation ensues against a consumer-debtor, they know that an
attorney is involved in the case. This is proven through case law, which

217. See id.
218. See Ethics Opinion, supra note 8.
219. Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2009) (Jolly, J., dissenting).
220. See supra Part III.B.3.
221. Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, 27 F.3d 1254, 1259 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
222. Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996).
223. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013).
224. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2013).
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has determined attorneys who file a lawsuit without having evidence of a
debt do not violate the FDCPA.225
The disclaimer of involvement that was made prevalent through
Greco226 should be struck down by the federal courts as the Ethics
Opinion has provided. An attorney should not be allowed to wear
multiple hats in the debt collection field because they will always have
their title of attorney.
This title carries with it professional
responsibilities and will prevent ethical obligations from being pulled
into the FDCPA.227 If more states adopt an Ethics Opinion like New
Jersey’s, then those states would be taking a stand by regulating attorney
ethics more strictly. This would also provide the opportunity for
increased compliance with the FDCPA and uniformity in applying it
across the states. Moreover, consumer-debtors would also be put in a
better position by knowing that an attorney could not waive involvement
in sending a dunning letter.
If these lawsuits continue to go forward, a rebuttable presumption
should apply to the defendant-attorney. The presumption in each case
should be that the attorney has maintained the requisite standard of
ethical behavior if that attorney has not had any past ethical violations as
a result of renting out letterhead. A standard requiring the plaintiff to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attorney violated ethical
responsibilities and failed to comply with the FDCPA in letterhead cases
will diminish the use of ethical-like violations to award debtors statutory
damages where no actual damages are proved. By limiting these suits to
blatant violations like renting letterhead to a collection agency, the
FDCPA will continue in its proper purpose.
VII. Conclusion
Part of the FDCPA’s purpose is “to promote consistent State
action.”228 By leaving it to the states to regulate attorney discipline, the
federal courts will not have to make unnecessary determinations of
attorney ethical responsibilities and will be faced with FDCPA lawsuits
225. See Harvey v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 453 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2006);
Slanina v. United Recovery Sys., LP, No. 3:11-CV-1391, 2011 WL 5008367, at *2-3
(M.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2011); Derricotte v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, No. 10-1323, 2011 WL
2971540, at *6 (D.N.J. July 19, 2011).
226. See Greco v. Trauner, Cohen, & Thomas, L.L.P., 412 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 2005).
227. See Avila v. Rubin, 84 F.3d 222, 229 (7th Cir. 1996).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
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that truly protect consumer-debtors. Moreover, since a private cause of
action cannot be brought under the MRPC, and these FDCPA violations
are very similar in nature, the FDCPA should not permit them either.
Doing so only creates a further divide in the uniform application of the
FDCPA. Therefore, ethics should govern.
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